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Introduction
in the short-run. If the longer absenteeism of mothers from the labor market caused families to reduce their old-age savings, then this provides a threat to the identification strategy for this paper. In order to test whether longer parental leave durations impacted on family savings, I exploit an earlier increase of parental leave in 1986. The findings suggest that families do not respond to the longer parental leave by reducing savings.
Social security wealth can mainly affect private savings through two channels, as Feldstein (1974) states: The wealth replacement effect and the induced retirement effect.
According to the wealth replacement effect, the accumulation of social security wealth negatively impacts private savings. Since the accumulation of public pension wealth increases old-age income through pensions, it substitutes for household assets. Very often public pensions provide incentives for individuals to retire earlier than they would have retired without the provision of public pensions. In order to compensate for the longer period of retirement these individuals would increase their private savings while working. The net effect of social security wealth on private savings is an empirical question. In his seminal paper, Feldstein (1974) analyzed the relationship between public pension wealth and private savings. He uses aggregate time series data from the United States from 1929 through 1971, excluding the WWII years, to estimate an aggregate consumption function that includes inter alia an estimate of household security wealth. He finds that the wealth replacement effect strongly dominates the induced retirement effect. Social security wealth actually replaces 30 -50 percent of private savings. However, these initial estimations of the displacement effect of public pension wealth on private savings might be inconsistent due to aggregation problems (Alessie et al., 2013; Feldstein and Liebman, 2002) .
The seminal work by Feldstein (1974) was followed by several studies that relied on different sources of variation (e.g. Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) ; King and DicksMireaux (1982) ; Hubbard (1986); Japelli (1995) ). Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) find almost a one-to-one displacement effect of private assets with respect to Social Security Wealth based survey data from 1963 from the United States. Similarly, Hubbard (1986) finds a displacement effect of public pension wealth on private savings; however the effect is substantially smaller. Japelli (1995) constructs a measure of expected pension wealth based on survey information on retirement age and replacement rates for Italy. He finds that an additional lira of pension wealth replaces between 10% and 20% of private wealth, depending on the specification. Gale (1998) shows that most previous papers, which typically regress non-pension assets inter alia on cash wages and pension wealth, underestimate the displacement effect of pension wealth. He fur-ther elaborates that the offset of pension wealth on non-pension assets rises with age.
As a consequence he suggests an adjustment factor for pension wealth to correct for the bias.
The previous papers rely either on aggregate data, which may be subject to aggregation difficulties, or on constructed measures of pension wealth based on self-reported information. Since differences in pension wealth could just reflect different tastes for old-age savings, using direct measures of pension wealth might not always lead to consistent results. More recent papers exploit exogenous variation in pension wealth to estimate its impact on non-pension wealth. Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) exploit three major U.K. pension reforms to estimate the impact of pension wealth on the savings rate using time series and cross-sectional variation based on the Family Expenditure Survey. They find no significant reactions to changes in the flat-rate Basic State Pension but substantial reductions of the savings rate due to changes in the earnings-related pension scheme. Similarly, Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) estimate the impact of a large Italian pension reform in 1992 on the household savings rate in a difference-indifference setting. Based on data from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth, they find that pension wealth can be interpreted as a substitute for private financial wealth, in particular for individuals aged 35-45. Using the same data set, Bottazzi et al. (2006) emphasize that expectations about an individual's pension wealth are important for the adjustment reaction. When estimating the combined impact of the three Italian pension reforms (1992, 1995 and 1997) , they find a large displacement of private wealth by perceived pension wealth, especially when workers are well informed about their pension wealth. Finally, Lachowska and Myck (2015) exploit a Polish pension reform in 1999 using the Polish Household Budget Surveys to analyze the effect of pension wealth on household savings relying on a difference-in-differences design.
They find that one additional Polish zloty of pension wealth crowds out about 0.24 Polish zloty of household savings. Focusing on highly educated and older households this effect is close to minus one.
Similar to these last studies, this paper also exploits exogenous variation in pension wealth. Nevertheless, this paper differs in various aspects. While most papers exploit large variations in pension wealth, the relative importance of the increase in pension entitlements through the child care pension benefit is typically lower. Further, affected families can adjust their old-age savings over a longer time period before they enter retirement. Nevertheless, it is important to investigate if families adjust their savings even though the variation in their pension wealth is only moderate. The findings of the paper are as follows: The child care pension benefit increases a mother's pension wealth without crowding-out private old-age savings. Hence the child care pension benefit compensates mothers for employment interruptions by improving their old-age income.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section describes the institutional background of the German pension system, in particular the role of child care pension benefits. Then, the identification strategy is described. Section 4 describes the data and sample construction. Section 5 covers the results. The final section concludes.
Institutional background
This section introduces the institutional background of the German Pension System, with specific background on the child care pension benefit.
The public pension plays a predominant role in the old-age income in Germany. Among retirees households, about two-thirds of household gross income originates from the public pension system.
3 Pension contributions are translated into so-called pension points. A pension point represents the annual pension contributions that are made by a worker who earns the average remuneration. Employees who earn a share of the average remuneration, accordingly contribute the corresponding share of a pension point. The value of the average remuneration is adjusted each year. At the verge of retirement, the amount of pension payments depends essentially on the sum of accumulated pension points over the course of working life. Pension points that are accumulated early in life are treated the same way as pension points that were accrued shortly before retirement.
In 2015, a pension point represents about e 29 (West Germany) of monthly pension payments (assuming the basic old-age pension without deductions). This so-called 'current pension value' is adjusted each year.
While most pension entitlements stem from contributions from employment, there are a few exceptions. One of them are pension entitlements that are granted for childraising periods that preclude employment. Table 1 sketches the development of the child care pension benefit from 1986 through 1999, following its introduction. 4 In 1986, the child care pension benefit was introduced to compensate mothers for child-raising periods that preclude employment. In this era, 3 Based on households with the reference person being 65 years or older (BMAS, 2015) . 4 Since the data period is restricted to from 1998 to 2008, the most recent reform in 2014 is not relevant for the analysis. In 2014, the duration of the child care pension benefit was extended retrospectively from one to two years for births prior to 1992. from the child care pension benefit were reduced by compulsory pension entitlements from employment if a mother was employed in that year.
The pension reform in 1992 tripled the duration of the child care pension benefit from one to three years for all births on January 1, 1992, or later. Hence, the pension wealth of affected mothers increased by up to 2.25 pension points through the child care pension benefit. In monetary terms, this is equivalent to e 780 per year. Compared to births prior to the cut-off date January 1, 1992, the child care pension benefit increased by 1.5 pension points.
The pension reform in 1999 increased gradually and retrospectively the generosity of the benefit for each year from 0.75 to one pension point. 7 Further, there was no longer an employment penalty if a mother became employed during periods for which the child care pension benefit was granted if the sum of pension entitlements from employment and the child care pension benefit did not exceed the pension entitlements based on the contribution ceiling. In 2015, the contribution ceiling amounts to twice the average remuneration or e 72,600.
5 Mothers who were born before 1921 were not entitled. However, they were entitled to a similar pension benefit. 6 Assuming basic old-age retirement without deductions and West German pension values. 7 The monthly value at retirement of the child care pension benefit was increased from July, 1998 to 0.85 pension points, from July, 1999 to 0.9 pension points and from July, 2000 to one pension point ( §256d SGB VI).
Old-age income typically stems from different sources such as the public pension fund, private pension schemes, transfers, private wealth and other sources. By increasing the monthly pension payments, the child care pension benefit lowers, ceteris paribus, the incentives for private old-age savings. Two children for instance, who are both born after 1991, would increase a mother's annual pension payments by about e 2,090 -at the most -through the child care pension benefit, based on 2015 West German pension values. However, since the generosity of the child care pension benefit depends on the date of child birth, mothers face different savings incentives depending on the child's date of birth. Comparing a mother A, whose child was born in 1991, to a mother B who had a child in 1992, then the negative old-age savings incentive is much stronger for mother A, since she benefits to a smaller extend from the child care pension benefit.
8
The previous example implicitly assumed that mothers do not retire earlier in response to the increase in their pension wealth. This induced retirement effect would motivate mothers to increase old-age savings to compensate for the longer period of retirement.
Previous evidence suggests that the net old-age savings effect is negative, however its magnitude is an empirical question.
Identification
The paper exploits the pension reforms in 1992 and 1999 as natural experiments to identify the impact of higher individual pension wealth on family savings. Table 2 shows the positive impact of the child care pension benefit on pension entitlements of mothers by the child's year of birth (1991 or 1992) and for two different points in time. While panel (A) reports the changes in pension entitlements measured in pension points, panel (B) shows their monetary equivalence. In general, the pension entitlements of a 1992 mother increase more strongly than those of a 1991 mother. Based on the regulation of 1992, the child care pension benefit augments the annual pension payments of a mother by e 261 if her child was born in 1991 and by e 783 if it was born in the next calender year. The reform of the child care pension benefit in 1999, fully 8 It has to be mentioned that retirees can only take advantage of the child care pension benefit if their pension level exceeds the one that corresponds to the minimum pension. Otherwise, their pension payments would be increased in order to reach the minimum pension level. Then, the child care pension benefit would have no impact on the level of pension payments. However, the share of retirees who receive the minimum pension is very low. In 2011, the share of persons aged 65
or older who receive the minimum pension is 2.6% (Duschek and Lemmer, 2013) . Further, to take advantage of the child care pension benefit a mother has to fulfill the general requirements of five years of contributions for being entitled to the old-age pension. (Ekberg et al., 2013, p. 135) . Nevertheless, the literature documents some shifting of births by parents for a few public benefits reforms that are based on a specific cut-off date (Neugart and Ohlsson, 2013; Gans and Leigh, 2009; Tamm, 2012) .
Whether child births might have been postponed and shifted from 1991 into 1992 was already investigated by Dustmann and Schönberg (2008, Appendix A) . However, they do not find any evidence that child births were shifted around the turn of the year. Second, a systematic difference could arise from the fact that a child born in 1991 is on average one year older than a child who was born in 1992. Ideally, one would compare parents who had a child shortly around the cut-off date 1/1/1992, e.g. based on child births in December 1991 and January 1992. However, the data set only provides information about the year of birth. 11 Therefore, the empirical model controls factors that are different across both groups as a result of this age difference, namely the parent's age and employment status. To cross-validate the assumption of random assignment, I
perform a standard test in empirical work and compare the distribution of observable characteristics across both groups (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The results do not provide evidence for a non-random selection (c.f. Table 3 ).
Third, is the more generous child care pension benefit the only systematic difference across treatment and control groups? Regarding institutional differences, other pension reforms were dependent on the mother's and not the child's date of birth. Therefore they identically affected mothers in the treatment and control groups. However, in 1992 not only the child-care pension benefit, but also parental leave was extended in the same discontinuous way. The reform extended the parental leave duration from 18 to 36 months for all newborns from January 1, 1992. The longer parental leave period for 1992 mothers is a threat to the identification strategy if old-age savings behavior in the treatment group was affected by the policy change. Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) document that mothers substantially postponed the return into the labor market after child birth in the short-run, but not in the long-run. Since mothers in the control group tend to return earlier into employment than mothers in the treatment group, they could accumulate more pension entitlements through compul-10 The date does not contain births for Saarland. 11 The data is explained in detail in section 4.
sory pension contributions in this period. These additional pension entitlements would then reduce the positive savings incentive for 1991 mothers relative to 1992 mothers.
However, this theoretical savings effect is likely to be rather small. First, mothers who re-entered employment at that time were very likely to work part-time (see e.g. Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2005)) and on average the amount of additional pension points they accrued relative to the treatment group would rather have been very small. Nevertheless, to assess the impact of the parental leave duration on old-age savings, I exploit a previous parental leave extension in 1986 to estimate its impact on savings. Despite the fact that the two parental leave extensions, in 1992 and in 1986, are not entirely comparable, this exercise provides evidence that the impact of the parental leave extension on family savings is rather low (c.f. Section 5.4.1).
Further, the child care pension benefit could have had an indirect effect on old-age savings via employment. The more generous child care pension benefit for 1992 mothers provides an incentive for mothers to return later into employment due to the higher pension wealth. If 1991 mothers return earlier into employment and if employed mothers are more likely to contribute a higher fraction of income to family savings, then the identification strategy of this paper could not distinguish the direct impact of the child care pension benefit from its indirect effect through employment on family oldage savings. In Thiemann (2015) I study how child care pension benefits affect the employment decision of mothers in the short-and the medium-run. However, I do not find empirical support for the presumption that mothers return later into employment as a results of the more generous child care pension benefit.
The empirical method that underlies the identification strategy of this paper is the regression discontinuity design. If individuals cannot precisely control the assignment rule into the control and the treatment group, then this treatment variation is "as good as randomized." As a result, the regression discontinuity design (RDD), if applicable, is often considered as potentially more credible than other research designs that exploit natural experiments (Lee and Lemieux, 2010, p. 282) and hence it is not surprising that it is applied in various economic and non-economic studies.
12
The econometric model that investigates the impact of pension wealth on old-age 12 Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) introduced the method to investigate the impact of merit awards on future academic outcomes. Angrist and Lavy (1999) rely on the regression discontinuity design when they investigate how class size influences the test scores of students in Israel. Black (1999) studies how much parents are willing to pay in order to send their children into better schools.
An overview of applications of the regression discontinuity design in economics is provided by Lee and Lemieux (2010) .
savings is specified in the following way:
For the dependent savings variables SV, I rely on flow and stock information: Savings relative to gross income, savings relative to net income, and the stock of net wealth. For each concept, the model is estimated separately. i indicates the family and t determines the cross-section to which the family belongs to (1998, 2003 or 2008 the indicators for the age of a mother control non-parametrically for the length of her adjustment horizon (the time until retirement). When a mother experiences a change of her pension wealth, the savings reaction tends to be the smaller the longer the period in which savings can be adjusted and the further away she is from the expected retirement entry date. Hence, the savings response of a family with a young mother is usually, ceteris paribus, smaller than the response of a family with an older mother, based on the same variation in pension wealth (Gale, 1998 ). An alternative specification also includes interaction terms to control for the differential impact of being a 1992 mother in different years: 
Data
The empirical analysis relies on the Income and Consumption Survey (Einkommensund Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS ). The EVS is based on a stratified quota sample of about 0.2 percent of private households and repeated every five years. In 2008, about 55,000 to 59,000 households participated, depending on the section of the survey. For a thorough description of the EVS, I refer to Statistisches Bundesamt (2013) . In addition to socio-demographic information about household members, the data offers detailed information about income and expenditure and wealth components 13 of German households. The EVS only covers households whose net earnings do not exceed e 18,000 per month. However, this limitation is of minor concern as the share of households earning more than e 18,000 per month is very small 14 and these households are most likely hardly affected by the child care pension benefit because the increase in pension wealth is very small relative to their monthly income. While the EVS contains the year of birth of household members, it does not inform about the precise month of birth. Therefore, the assignment of families into the control and treatment group must be made based on the child's year of birth. I rely on the scientific use files of the EVS: a 80% sub-sample, which provides information for more than 42,000 households per wave (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013 Bundesamt, , 2005 Bundesamt, , 2002 
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Parents who had a child, either in 1991 or 1992, are selected into the sample, which is the case for 8,854 families. If parents had more than one child in 1991 or in 1992, they are excluded because pension entitlements of these mothers increased more because child care pension benefits are granted per child. I also exclude parents who had a child in 1991 and another one in 1992 because they had to be assigned into the 13 While the EVS informs about real estate as well as financial wealth components, it does not provide sufficient information about business wealth. 14 Based on the GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) data, the share of households with a net income of at least e 18,000 is less than 1% in 2008. treatment and control groups. In addition, families in which a mother is either selfemployed, a freelancer, a civil servant or already retired are not considered since these mothers are less likely to be affected by the child care pension benefit. In Germany, many of these professions have separate pension schemes. Further, I only consider West German households since after re-unification in 1990, East Germany experienced a dramatic drop in fertility that is likely to have been selective (Chevalier and Olivier, 2015) . Finally, I focus on couple families with no other household members than children. Hence, all households that are included are families where both parents are part of the same household.
17 The remaining final sample size is 5,450 families.
Results
Next, this section discusses the descriptive results and the findings from estimating the econometric model. Table 3 compares the different savings/wealth concepts and socio-demographic characteristics for the treatment and the control groups. Both savings rates -relative to gross income and relative to net income -are similar across treatment and control groups.
Descriptive results
On average, about 13% (10%) of household net income (gross income) is declared as savings. This provides some first indication that families in the treatment group tend not to substitute old-age savings with public pension wealth. Nevertheless, families in the treatment group hold more net wealth on average. But parents in the treatment group are -due to construction -about a year younger than in the control group. Further, the share of employed mothers seems to be slightly higher in the treatment group.
The remaining socio-demographic characteristics are very similar across treatment and control groups. Most fathers are employed, with about one third holding a university degree. The corresponding share among women is 17%. Finally, families have, on average, about two children. To sum up, the comparison of the socio-demographic characteristics across treatment and control group suggests that families of 1991 mothers are not systematically different in observable characteristics from families of 1992 mothers.
17 In a further step, the paper estimates the savings responses for single mothers (section 5.3). 
Main results
Next, Table 4 provides an econometric assessment of the impact of pension wealth on old-age savings, exploiting the increase of the child care pension benefit. While in the left panel of the table savings is related to net income, in the right panel the savings rate is based on gross income. In the following, 'Treatment' is defined as the impact of being in the treatment group, i.e. families with a child birth in 1992, on a family's old-age savings. are almost identical and in none of the four specifications, the estimated relationship appears to be statistically significant. Considering all results together, it suggests that overall the the more generous individual child care pension benefit had no impact on family savings decisions.
Next, Table 5 focuses on the impact of the treatment on the stock of net wealth. The OLS results are shown for Equation 1 and 2, with and without the inclusion of controls.
In the first column, the base model predicts a very strong significant negative impact of treatment on the stock of net wealth. Accordingly, being in the treatment group would reduce net wealth substantially by about e 15,000. Even though, this negative relationship is in line with our expectations, the effect size is very large. However, after adding controls the magnitude of the effect becomes much smaller and it turns insignificant. Since, parents in the control group are on average about one year older, it seems quite plausible that their stock of wealth is higher. stresses the importance of including the age of parents as regressors to account for this age difference between the two groups. The interaction model confirms these findings.
Likewise, the interaction model without controls finds a strong negative and significant effect that vanishes after including controls into the model. Considered together, the findings suggest that the negative savings incentives, implied by the more generous child care pension benefit, did not influence the savings behavior of affected parents.
What could be potential explanations for the lack of finding a savings response of parents? Parents could have a strong discount factor or a short decision-making horizon.
For these parents the magnitude of the beneficial provision of the child care pension benefit would have been too small, since they value current income more strongly than future income. Alternatively, they might not have considered the impact of today's decision on future income. To test whether the relative importance of child care pension benefits in old-age income matters, one should divide the sample according to the level of the expected old-age income of a family and repeat the analysis. The maximum gain from the more generous child care pension benefit provision is generally not dependent on future old-age income. Hence, the relative importance of the child care pension benefits for old-age income diminishes with increasing expected old-age income. Since the data does not provide information about future old-age income, I split the sample according to net income and net wealth, which seems to be a good proxy and repeat the analysis. Again, in three of the four quartiles the treatment effects are relatively small and statistically insignificant. Only for families whose net wealth falls in the second quartile is the treatment estimate negative and weakly significant. Accordingly, the more generous child care pension benefit lowers their savings rate moderately by about three percentage points. Now, we focus on the lower panel of the table, where the outcome is net wealth. Again, comparing the treatment effect by net income quartiles does not provide a clear pattern. All four separate treatment estimates are statistically insignificant. Repeating the exercise based on the net wealth quartiles shows that apart from the estimated treatment effect in the first quarter, which is only weakly statistically significant, all estimates are statistically insignificant.
Heterogeneous effects
19 The results for the savings rate, based on gross income, are very similar and available upon request. Notes: The sample is based on West German couple families who had one child either in 1991 (control group) or in 1992 (treatment group). Net wealth is measured in e 100,000s. */**/*** Statistically significant at the 10%/5%/1%-level, robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
All specifications are based on the model that is specified by equation 2, including control variables.
They are the parent's education, the father's age, family size, as well as the federal states and the interview quarter. The specifications that include control variables also control non-parametrically for the age of the mother. All specifications include a constant. Considered together, the findings suggest that families do not react differently to the more generous child care pension benefit, depending neither on their position in the net income nor net wealth distribution. Only families in the treatment group who are in the second net wealth quartile tend to save less in response to the more generous child care pension benefit.
So far, the sample consists of families in which both parents were present. Next, I
focus on a subgroup of the population that might have been affected in particular by the more generous child care pension benefit provision. In contrast to couple families, the old-age income of single mothers is based on their own pension wealth and old-age savings. Single mothers cannot pool their old-age income with a partner -if they remain single -and hence a change in their pension wealth might have a stronger impact on their savings behavior. Further, single mothers generally posses less wealth than couple families (see Table 3 and Table 15 ). Therefore, they belong to a more vulnerable subgroup of the population. Table 15 in the appendix compares the sample characteristics by the correspond- Notes: The sample is based on West-German single mothers who had one child either in 1991 (control group) or in 1992 (treatment group). Net wealth is measured in e 100,000s. */**/*** Statistically significant at the 10%/5%/1%-level, robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
The control variables contain the mother's education, the mother's employment status, family size, as well as indicators for the federal states and the interview quarter. The specifications that include control variables also control non-parametrically for the age of the mother. All specifications include a constant.
Data source: Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) 1998 (EVS) , 2003 (EVS) , and 2008 ing treatment and control groups that are constructed analogously to couple families.
Mothers in the treatment group are not substantially different from mothers in the control group. Solely, 1991 mothers tend to be more likely to be in employment compared to 1992 mothers. However, for the purpose of this analysis the two groups seem to be comparable. Table 7 shows the treatment effect for single mothers. In the left part of the table, the outcome is defined as savings/net income. 20 In the right part, the outcome is defined as net wealth. In contrast to the previous econometric models, the control variables that are included are the mother's education, the mother's employment status, family size, the federal states and the the interview quarter. First, we focus on the left panel that relates family savings to net income. In the Base model, the estimated impact of being in the treatment group is negative and very small. Taking the point estimate at its face value, the increase in pension wealth -due to the more generous child care pension benefit -would reduce the savings rate by 0.26 percentage points. However, this relationship is not statistically significant. The inclusion of control variables does not affect the estimated effect. Considering the estimated impact based on the interaction model, the estimated effect is -2.6 to -3 percentage points, but not statistically significant. The right panel shows the estimated treatment effect, when the outcome is net wealth. The first column of the base model predicts a moderate negative impact on net wealth. However, after including controls, the effect estimate turns even positive and its magnitude becomes much smaller. The same pattern is true for the interaction model. After including controls, the magnitude of the point estimate shrinks substantially. However, all point estimates are statistically insignificant, reflecting the statistical uncertainty due to the smaller sample size.
Considering the findings for single mothers together, no reaction to the increase in their pension wealth due to the more generous child care pension benefit can be identified, neither for the savings rate nor for their stock of net wealth.
Sensitivity checks
This section tests the sensitivity of the empirical findings.
Parental Leave and family savings
As previously described, the parental leave extension that was introduced in 1992 for newborns -similar to the increase in the generosity of the child care pension benefitimposes a threat to the identification strategy if families adjust their savings as a result of longer parental leave. To assess the potential impact of parental leave on savings, I exploit the parental leave expansion in 1986. Starting from January 1986, parental leave was expanded from 6 to 10 months and all mothers became entitled to maternity payment regardless of their employment status prior to child birth (Dustmann and Schönberg, 2011) . Families who had a child in 1986 -being entitled to longer parental leave -are expected, certeris paribus, to increase old-age savings compared to mothers who had a child shortly before the policy change -being entitled to the shorter parental leave.
This institutional feature allows us to apply the same identification strategy, used in this paper. Mothers who had a child in 1986 -being affected by the parental leave expansion -are selected into a treatment group. Whereas families who had a child in 1985 -not affected by the parental leave expansion -are selected into a control group.
The parental leave sample mimics the sample that is used in the main part of the Table 8 shows the mean comparison of the sample characteristics across treatment and control groups. First, the savings rate based on net income is slightly but not statistically significant higher in the treatment group. Savings relative to gross income is about 10% in both groups and net wealth is about e 220,000. Parents are statistically significant older in the control group. This is not surprising since children in the 21 Comparing births in 1985 and 1986 based on this data makes it more likely that some children are no longer living in the same household. However, this does not affect the identification since children leaving the household identically affects the treatment and control groups.
control group are on average one year older at the time of the interview. However, it is important to control for the parent's age in the regression analysis. The parent's employment status and share of parents holding a university degree does not differ between the treatment and the control groups. Finally, all families have on average two children at the time of the interview. To sum up, the comparison of the sample characteristics across the treatment and the control groups suggests that both groups are relatively similar. Next, we focus on the results from the estimations depicted in Table 9 . The first row contains the estimated impact of being in the treatment group on old-age savings.
While in the base model, the treatment effect is captured by a single indicator, the interaction model allows for a differential treatment effect in the three different waves.
When we do not include controls, the treatment impact is positive and weakly statistically significant. After including controls, however, being in the treatment group does not affect family savings. To conclude, this analysis provides evidence that parents tend not to respond to an increase of parental leave by higher old-age savings.
Bandwidth variation
In order to test whether the empirical findings are sensitive to how the bandwidth around the reform cut-off date 1/1/1992 is defined, this section increases the sample and repeats the estimation. So far a family entered the treatment group if it had a child in 1992, hence benefiting from the longer duration of the child care pension benefit.
Families who had a child in 1991 -being subject to the shorter child care pension benefit duration -are in the control group. While it is well known that a larger sample increases efficiency, comparing parents who had a child further away from the cut-off date of the reform (1/1/1992) is less desirable. Those families are more likely to differ in more dimensions than in the child care pension benefit scheme. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this sensitivity check a range of two years is chosen. Now families who had a child in 1990 or 1991 are in the control group, while families who had a child in 1992 or 1993 are in the treatment group. Table 16 in the appendix provides a comparison of the observable characteristics across the two groups. The descriptive comparison does not provide evidence for a systematic difference across treatment and control groups, apart from parents in the control group being on average older and possessing higher levels of net wealth. Table 10 provides the estimated impact of the more generous child care pension benefit on family old-age savings for two scenarios relying on the interaction model, including control variables (equation 2). Comparing the estimated treatment effect from the larger bandwidth to the baseline scenario shows that both models lead to almost identical results even though the sample is nearly twice as large. As in the baseline model, the estimated savings responses are not statistically significant different from zero. 6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper investigates whether a mother's pension wealth crowds-out private savings of families. To identify causal effects I exploit variation in pension wealth given by two extensions of the German child care pension benefit in 1992 and in 1999 using a regression discontinuity design. Child care pension benefits generally increase a mother's pension entitlements in periods when child care precludes work.
The empirical results show that neither old-age savings nor net wealth of couple families that benefited from the more generous child care pension benefit is affected. The analysis of subgroups along the family net wealth or net income quartiles confirms the general findings. The savings response in the first quartile is not substantially different from the one of families in the top quartile. In contrast to couple families, where the relative importance of a mother's pension wealth is lower, single mothers are potentially more prone to be affected by the reforms of the child care pension benefit. However, when analyzing the savings response to the reforms of the child care pension benefit of single mothers, the findings are line with those for couple families. The higher pension wealth does equally not induce single mothers to adjust old-age savings.
The main goal of child care pension benefits is to compensate mothers for child-raising periods that preclude employment. The empirical findings provide evidence that child care pension benefits indeed increase pension wealth without crowding-out private oldage savings. Hence, the child care pension benefit compensates mothers for employment interruptions due to child-raising periods and hence improve the individual old-age income of mothers. A recent pension reform in 2014 increased the pension entitlements -through the child care pension benefit -that are granted to mothers for child births prior to 1992 from one to two years. Based on the findings of this paper, the new so called 'mother's pension' is unlikely to affect old-age savings of mothers. Notes: The sample is based on West German couple families who had a child either in 1991 (control group) or in 1992 (treatment group). The specifications that include control variables also control non-parametrically for the age of the mother. The education variable definition is as follows: 1 (reference category) -'university degree', 2 'technical college degree', 3 'senior clerk, technician, master craftsman', 4 'apprenticeship', 5 'other professional qualification', 6 'undergoing training', 7 'no degree'. */**/*** Statistically significant at the 10%/5%/1%-level. Notes: The sample is based on West German single mothers who had a child either in 1991 (control group) or in 1992 (treatment group). The specifications that include control variables also control non-parametrically for the age of the mother. The education variable definition is as follows: 
